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REFLECTIONS ON SIXTY YEARS OF WATER LAW PRACTICE
GLENN G. SAUNDERS
I have a long history in the water business—longer than I
ever expected it to be in my first encounter in 1918. During
World War I we were very short of any responsible help. I was a
responsible boy, and a near neighbor of the Chief Engineer of the
Denver Union Water Company. His chauffeur (only a few people
tried to drive these newfangled contraptions) lived just back of
us, so that I had an opportunity from time to time to drive in
the water company's Stevens-Duryea open car to various points of
the Denver Union Water Company system. Consequently, in the
summer of 1918 I was employed to watch the float gauges on the
clear water basins at the Capitol Hill Pump Station in Denver,
which supplied water to everything east of the South Platte
River.
The reason these gauges had to be watched so closely was
that there were many wood-stave conduits in the Denver Union
Water Company system, which were the principal supply of filtered
water, and if one of them broke, it needed to be known immediate
ly. If one of these gauges started to fall rapidly, it meant
that a conduit had broken. At that time there was no telemetric
enunciator to locate the break. So it was important that the
gauges be watched constantly, and if they fell, a notification
sent immediately to the central office of the Denver Union Water
Company. I terminated this job on August 1, 1918, when the City
and County of Denver took over the water plant from the Denver
Water Company after a long series of hearings by a referee
(Chinn) in the United States District Court as to the valuation
which must be paid for the plant by the City.
I had also been familiar with the arguments pro and con as
to whether or not Denver, as a municipal corporation, should own
the private enterprise which was the Denver Union Water Company.
My father was such a right-wing conservative that he did not
believe that government should do hardly anything other than run
a police department. Our next door neighbor, Ben Sweet, was a
member of the first board of water commissioners and a proponent
of public ownership, so that I had the benefit of backyard, over-
the-fence arguments about the merits of public ownership as
against the merits of private enterprise.
I returned from law school in 1929 at the commencement of
the Great Depression, which was to deepen in the years ahead. I
had absolutely no regard for the criminal law practice in which
my father was busily engaged. So I went to my old friend, the
Mayor Ben Stapleton, who had helped raise me during a period when
he was a widower and who had inculcated in me some of his own
very high ideals. He told me that the Denver Water Department
had a brilliant attorney, Malcolm Lindsey, as its special counsel
in water matters. The City Charter at that time made it the duty
of the City Attorney to render all legal service required by the
Board of Water Commissioners. He pointed out that the City
Attorney had so many irons in the fire that it was necessary to
have special water counsel and that he would like to have me get
the benefit of tutelage by Malcolm Lindsey and devote a major
part of my energies to helping create a water supply for Denver.
Stapleton had three basic community objectives: 1) an
adequate water supply to be derived from the tributaries of the
Colorado River, 2) a major ground transportation vehicular
system, and 3) a major airport. Stapleton initiated the Valley
Highway (now 1-25) through a design created by engineers Crocker
and Ryan, and he secured what is now known as Stapleton
International Airport by having his friend, Brown Cannon (who ran
a dairy called Windsor Farm Dairy), acquire the airport land
quietly at dry-grazing-land farm prices.
Stapleton said that the City never pays enough money to make
a decent living, and therefore if I went with the Water Board, I
must maintain the right to have a private practice—even though
he expected me to devote my major attention to creating a water
supply for Denver.
Denver Water Board
I went with the Water Board and found its legal affairs,
except for the protection of its water rights, to be in a
shambles because Charles H. Haines, a very competent Assistant
City Attorney who was assigned to the Water Department, had so
much other city work he simply could not keep up with it. He
welcomed me with open arms, came bouncing into my office at the
Water Department and tossed a Board request for an eminent domain
proceeding on my desk, saying "You will find out all about
eminent domain in the 6300's of the 1921 Compiled Laws." Since I
was not yet admitted to practice law, he said, "Just sign my name
to things and call me on the phone if you think you need any
advice."
I found myself in the midst of a number of lawsuits
immediately and found that the Lock Joint Pipe Company had six
miles of pipe strewn out on public highways and no right-of-way
to place the pipe. There was no negotiation team to acquire
right-of-way, so I became the team, the lawyer, and the financial
adviser.
Fortunately, the Water Board had an exceedingly competent
manager by the name of Hiriam Hilts, formerly a business
executive for Henry M. Porter, who endowed what is now the Porter
Hospital. Hilts had left the hospital, after integrating the
Porter gift into the hospital's business, to run the Water
Department. With his help and my youthful energy, we soon had
legal affairs in pretty good shape so that I could begin learning
water law from Mr. Lindsey.
Lindsey and I made an excellent combination. He had never
gone to law school, but had studied law while being a court
reporter in Trinidad, so that his education was from the grass
roots up. A very quiet man, he did not like the vigor of a
head-to-head contest. This is what I enjoyed most about the
practice of law: the adversary proceeding. Consequently, I
learned water law from him, and he sat as a spectator while I
conducted litigation. I had nothing to unlearn about Colorado
water law because the subject was not taught at the University of
Michigan, where I had my law course, and thus was enabled to
learn water law at the hands of the people who were practicing
it: such people as Watt McKendrie of Pueblo, Bill Kelly of
Greeley, and Frank Delaney of Glenwood Springs. These were
followed by many other fine water lawyers who were either a part
of our team or our adversaries.
At that time, members of the Board of Water Commissioners
were the type of people you would find on the directorate of any
important utility corporation, such as the Public Service
Company, the telephone company, or the tramway. These men,
except for A. P. Gumlick, had their own businesses to tend to and
expected Water Board employees to take leadership in the
development of the system. Gumlick and his wife were financially
able to devote their energies to public service. I found myself
in the position of working very closely with Mr. Gumlick—
President of the Board, the manager, the engineering division,
and the accounting division in planning the progress of creating
an adequate water supply for what was obviously a growing major
city of the United States, centrally located so that it would
probably always be a hub in the North American Continent with a
permanence such as we find in places like Rome or London. I was
always impressed with the fact that we were building a water
system for thousands of years in the future and that every move
we made would be magnified either for better or for worse. This
impressed me with the necessity for doing the job right the first
time so that it would not have to be corrected at great expense
in the future.
Need for Water Development
In the 193 0s, 1940s and 1950s when Denver was most
vigorously developing its water supply system, the attitude of
the public, the legislature and judiciary generally was the same
as it had been since the middle of the 19^n Century: Do everyth
ing you can to develop a civilized community in this near- desert
country by developing our water resources for beneficial use.
During the last decade (1980s) this attitude had been severely
diluted by a current generation which enjoys the comfort of a now
civilized environment. Forgetting that the civilization on which
the good life exists in Colorado, with its skiing and other
recreational advantages, depends on the careful management of our
limited water resources, many people (often referred to as
"environmentalists") have now come to the attitude that water
should be wasted by leaving it in the streams for the fish and
the stream fishermen, eliminating more reservoir construction (in
spite of improved fishing) without any realization that the
population of the United States is constantly increasing and that
Denver's population and water needs will go on increasing for
many years to come. The current political trend is to do
everything possible to prevent any further development of water
supplies and to limit any development to that done by public
agencies rather than allowing the private entrepreneur to invest
his money and talent to meet the new needs of the growing
community. This change is reflected in the changing water law
scene.
The Prior Appropriation Doctrine
The 17 western states of the United States are generally
semi-arid and all have adopted what is known as the appropriation
doctrine with respect to the use of the streams. Under this
doctrine, in order to encourage development of water for benefi
cial use to create a civilized community out of a relatively
barren public domain, early miners and farmers and other settlers
were encouraged to expend their energy (and what little money
they had) to divert water from the natural streams and apply it
to beneficial uses, such as growing crops, supplying towns and
cities, and for manufacturing purposes.
To encourage the development of the country, new law was
created by the customs of the people, later fortified by consti
tutional provisions, statutes (both state and federal) and court
decisions, giving a prior right over later developers, to whoever
was willing to spend the time and money necessary to put water to
beneficial use. Thus, the settler was assured that his money and
energy would not be wasted by assuring him the prior right, in
times of water shortage, to use the amount of water he had put to
beneficial use as against some later comer, perhaps located
farther upstream than the original settler. This system, used
throughout the western United States, had proven successful in
turning what was a barren wilderness into a productive and
civilized portion of the nation.
Permit System
In permit states where a water right cannot be created
except by permission of a person in government, the permit allows
a specific time for completion of the necessary physical works to
put the water to beneficial use. The government official issuing
the permit determines what he considers to be an appropriate time
within which to complete a project. Provision is made by statute
for extending the time on a showing to the permitting government
employee. The standards of judgment for determining necessary
time are not clear so that, from a practical standpoint, the
determination of the government person is considered by the
courts to be correct unless clearly arbitrary or unreasonable.
Colorado System
Of all the western states, Colorado has the simplest water
system. In every appropriation state but Colorado, whoever wants
to develop water has to get permission from a politician, that
is, a government employee, usually the state engineer, before he
can proceed. Until he gets that permission, he has no date of
appropriation. In Colorado, all the appropriator has to do is to
form an intent to appropriate water and make that intent known to
anyone who might be affected by it. No political influence or
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governmental authority has been historically allowed to interfere
with the growth of the state. As a result, Colorado had devel
oped far beyond what could have been done had the people been
inhibited by government bureaucracy.
A property right to divert water and apply it to beneficial
use is created at the moment that the intent is formed and the
manifestation of that intent to the general public occurs. This
property right originally could be protected only by the
uncertainty of a quiet title suit in court. But one of the first
acts of the legislature after Colorado became a state was to
provide a statewide system of adjudicating water rights so that
the extent of any appropriator's right would be determined in an
open, public court proceeding. The enforcement of these rights,
as fixed by the courts, has been administered by the office of
the state engineer.
Conditional Water Rights
The priority date of water rights is what gives them their
value. It is often many years before the water appropriated by
concurrence of intent and manifestation of the intent can
actually be put to beneficial use so as to complete the water
right. The justification for the very large expenditures of
money in the expectation of making good on the early dates grows
out of the Colorado water law concept, which has existed from the
earliest days, of granting conditional water court decrees— now
commonly called conditional water rights.
It took the people of Denver many years from the date of
initiation of their transmountain water rights to construct the
facilities necessary to carry the water to the people of the
Denver area, where it was put to use. When these water rights
were presented to the courts for adjudication, this time-honored
procedure, now protected by statute, was used. In this
procedure, the court recognized the property right to appropriate
water as of the date the intent was formed and exhibited to the
public, but the court's decree is conditioned on that intent
being followed up diligently by the construction of the necessary
works and then by the actual application of the water to the
intended beneficial use. These decrees recognized the validity
of the water right but conditioned their final validity on the
water right being perfected by the application of the water to
beneficial use with due diligence by the construction of the
facilities and the actual use of the water. From the earliest
days, Colorado residents have benefitted from this procedure, and
Denver's situation is simply illustrative of the value of this
conditional decree system.
The "Sheriff" Case
The first major water rights case in which I was involved
became City and County of Denver v. Sheriff. 105 Colo. 193, 96
P.2d 836(1939). This case involved the appropriation of water by
Denver to be transported through the pioneer bore of the Moffat
Tunnel from the headwaters of the Fraser River in western
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Colorado into the Platte River Basin in eastern Colorado. At
that time there were clearly two states, Colorado I, where the
capitol was located east of the Continental Divide, and Colorado
II west of the Continental Divide. The judges, the lawyers, the
legislators, and all local officials in Colorado II, so far as
water law was concerned, had their own law for western Colorado
and had never heard of the Colorado Constitution. Under this
concept, the trial judge, Charles C. Herrick, in Denver
v. Sheriff held that Denver could not transport any water out of
the Colorado River Basin until it had exhausted its water
resources in the Platte River Basin.
Meticulous and accurate as Malcolm Lindsey was, and faithful
to the letter of the law, he was utterly shocked by this ruling,
which was made from the bench at about 10:30 a.m. one morning, at
which time the judge announced that the court would reconvene at
one o'clock to hear any motions we might have to make. It was a
fine day, so A. P. Gumlick, who was president of the Board of
Water Commissioners and present at the proceedings, and I, after
thinking through what had to be done in court after lunch,
proceeded to enjoy the day while Mr. Lindsey went off by himself
in a high state of disbelief to prepare a motion for a new trial.
When we got back to court at one o'clock, Lindsey was so
upset that after two sentences, he turned the matter over to me.
I thereupon dictated the basis for the decree I thought we ought
to have. This basis subsequently became the decision of the
Colorado Supreme Court, reversing the local court and instructing
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the lower court that the constitution covered the entire state of
Colorado, being Colorado II as well as Colorado I.
It should be noted that the views of western Colorado judges
extended to transmountain diversions rater than their general
competency or integrity. This same Judge Herrick, when sitting
in a trial in Brighton, Colorado which involved the use of
Italian interpreters, rather violently pounced verbally on a
dishonest interpreter who was giving me trouble even though I was
the same attorney who got him reversed by the Supreme Court in
the Sheriff case. The interpreter did not realize that Judge
Herrick had been raised in the coal mine country of western
Colorado and spoke Italian as fluently as he did English, that
being a country where Italian and non-Italian workers worked
together and were all bilingual. The very much surprised
interpreter correctly formulated questions and answers after
Judge Herrick vigorously corrected him from the bench.
Right to Reuse Imported Water
From the earliest days, the statutes and most of the
decisions of the courts have provided that no water may be
diverted, regardless of the date of decree, except for applic
ation to beneficial use. Water may not be wasted, lawfully. When
a user is finished with his water, he must return any excess to
the nearest watercourse for use by others.
This leads to the further proposition that when water is
diverted from the Colorado River to the Platte River, the Platte
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River user may make a succession of uses before he returns that
water to the Platte River for use by others. Denver has taken
advantage of this situation by appropriating its Colorado River
water for complete utilization to the extent it can maintain
dominion over such water. Under procedures carefully established
as a part of creating Denver's Colorado River water rights,
careful measurements were made and continuously kept up of the
place of use, the amount of storage, and all details of the
disposition of all Colorado River water diverted.
First-In First-Out Practice
Under these practices, when Denver diverts Colorado River
water for storage in any of its reservoirs, it remains aware of
how much of that water was stored at any particular time and
draws that water out of storage which was first stored, although
the water from different years is commingled in the same vessel.
Since the mere storage of water does not constitute a beneficial
use, this practice became important. Until stored water is
actually used, any decree for that water must remain
conditional. This means that Denver would have to go back to
court every four years to show how it was continuing to maintain
its diligence toward the application of the water appropriated to
beneficial use. Denver maintains its records so as to show that
the water first in was first out for use.
This practice becomes quite important when it is realized
that a city hopes never to completely drain all of its
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reservoirs. Denver is acutely aware of this because in 1934 the
drought situation was so bad that in September, just before a
major flood occurred, Denver had only a four day supply in
storage. Coupled with the condition that there was almost no
water in the streams for direct diversion, this was a near
catastrophe.
Under the first-in first-out theory, Denver hopes to
maintain substantial storage at all times so as not to jeopardize
the welfare of hundreds of thousands of people being without
water to fight fires or even to sustain life. Under the first-in
first-out theory, a reservoir can be given an absolute decree
once its full capacity has been used even though it had not been
completely drained for beneficial use. By providing for complete
treatment of Denver's sewage returns, provision can be made so
that none of the transmountain water will be wasted and only what
Denver cannot successfully use and reuse will ultimately be
returned to the Platte River.
Water Reuse
The presently decreed water rights held by Denver are
sufficient to serve five million people, assuming a successive
use of diverted water through complete rehabilitation of
once-used water. While this may offend the sensibilities of some
people, it must be remembered that everybody on the Mississippi
River is using reused water. New Orleans is regarded as having
one of the safest and best water systems in the United States
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because it had learned to treat that Mississippi mud and turn it
into beautiful, potable water. So the people downstream from
Denver should not be concerned about reused water.
Denver's Colorado River Water Rights
During the early period of development, the Denver Water
Board employed a man by the name of George M. Bull as its
investigative engineer to develop the needed new water
resources. On July 4, 1921, he took a party into the field to
make the survey upon which Denver's transmountain water rights
are basically dependent. Denver secured a date for its
transmountain diversions for the Fraser and the Williams Fork
Rivers on July 4, 1921, which it protected against Lee Ferry
calls on the Colorado River water by the lower basin states
(principally California and Arizona) by virtue of provisions it
secured in the Upper Colorado River Compact.
Denver's efforts to get the same date for its Blue River
diversion failed, four to three, in the Colorado Supreme Court.
Denver v. Northern Colorado District. 130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d 992
(1954). The date granted was based on the fact that:
(1) Denver had made no survey, on the ground, in the Blue
River Basin in 1921 as it had in the Fraser and
Williams Fork Basins;
(2) it had changed its manner of diverting from a short,
high tunnel from the west to east slope to a long
tunnel plus a collection reservoir at Dillon; and
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(3) lack of continuous effort until February 16, 1946, the
date of approval of the final reservoir-tunnel plan,
which plan has since been constructed and put in
operation with that priority date.
The facilities were made more effective by a plan initiated
November 7, 1956, to add the Roberts Tunnel Collection System
facilities to bring more water to the Dillon Reservoir, thence
into the Two Forks Reservoir on the Platte and thence to the
Denver area. In all, Denver should readily be able to supply
five million people with the water rights which were nailed down
as a result of the Bull surveys and the adjudications which
followed them.
A. P. Gumlick, who was financially independent, devoted
almost his entire time to being president of the Denver Board of
Water Commissioners. A very frugal man from an economic
standpoint, he felt that unlimited annexation to Denver should
not be anticipated so that the people of Denver should not
finance the Blue River project but that it should be financed by
the areas outside the city through a Bureau of Reclamation
project. To this end, the South Platte Water Users Association
was formed in the summer of 1942 with William W. Gaunt, a
Brighton attorney, as its president. This association consisted
of Colorado Springs, Douglas County, Arapahoe County, Adams
County, and Jefferson County. Representatives of these entities
met at the high school in Englewood with E. B. Debler, who was in
charge of creating water projects of the United States Bureau of
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Reclamation, in an endeavor to create a project such as is now
typified by the Colorado-Big Thompson project, to develop the
Blue River resource without the use of Denver funds and so as to
supply additional water to all of the entities involved. It is
to be noted that Colorado Springs has since joined Aurora in
creating water supplies for those two front range communities
from tributaries of the Colorado River. The effort to turn the
Blue River project into a reclamation project instead of a Denver
project failed at the hands of the Colorado Supreme Court (Denver
v. Northern Colorado Water District), and the idea was abandoned.
Water Exchanges
Denver has been innovative in developing Colorado water law
in a number of respects. An example is securing a decree for
exchange of water using the natural stream and its waters as a
basis for moving water up and down a natural watercourse.
Recognizing the fungibility of the waters of natural streams, the
statutes since the nineteenth century authorized the use of these
waters as a vehicle for trading water placed in a steam at one
place and removing a like amount at another. With the increasing
demand for use of natural stream water for exchanging flows, it
became apparent several decades ago that conflicting demands
would mean that all desired exchanges could not sometimes be
made.
Denver believed that using the water of a natural stream for
exchange was a beneficial use for which a prior right could be
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secured. Consequently, before others began the practice, Denver
secured a prior right to use natural stream waters for exchanges
necessary for the proper operation of its systems. Since Denver
secured the first decree giving a prior right to use water for
exchange purposes, decrees for this purpose have become quite
common•
Issues Concerning Water Development
Although one would expect the United States government to be
trying to help all of the citizens of the United States, some of
its agencies have perennially opposed Denver's development of a
water supply. Its witnesses testified many years ago that the
waters being appropriated from the tributaries of the Colorado
River were not needed by the people of Denver, and figures were
brought together, particularly by one Randy Riter of the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation to show that Denver's population
growth would not be as projected by the Denver Water Department.
The Denver Water Department predictions have been entirely
corroborated by actual events over the last 50 years (1935-1985).
It is not surprising that the estimates of water need have
been accurate. The principal bases of these estimates have been
long-range projections by business interests in the community
which invest their money and thus put it at risk on the basis of
accurate determinations of the population that must be served.
Not only does the Water Department make its own projections, but
also the gas and electric utility, the telephone utility, and the
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voluntary organizations of commerce and industry. The estimates
of growth in 1988 have been challenged by environmental groups
opposed to changing the natural environment by conserving
Colorado's rivers for human consumption. The highly developed
civilization, not only urban but agricultural and industrial,
which has been created by taking waters from natural streams for
conservation, leads the beneficiaries of this civilization to
forget that the loss of natural flow of rivers has made it
possible to live in a civilized environment. Also overlooked is
the fact that Eastern Slope rivers such as the Platte and the
Arkansas supported a very limited irrigation community until
reservoirs were built to store spring floods for use later in the
summer.
Benefits of Storage
An example of the great benefit of conservation by storage
is the case of the South Platte River. By building reservoirs in
the mountains, Denver has made it possible to have a year-round
supply of water, much of which is used to create the beautiful
environment of trees, shrubs, flowers and lawns which now
characterizes the city which was once a near desert. The water
thus used percolates back rather slowly into the South Platte
River above most of the irrigation which is below Denver along
the Platte River on into Nebraska. In later years, the
construction and operation of the Big Thompson project by the
Bureau of Reclamation has had the same effect, but not quite so
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effectively because it is farther down stream than Denver.
Together, these projects, as well as the project of Aurora
bringing outside water into the Platte River and bringing storage
water as well, have created a continuous year-round flow of water
in the South Platte River. In the early days, the South Platte
went dry in August or September, and there was no nesting ground
either in Colorado or Nebraska for migrating birds. There simply
wasn't any water. Bird habitat was injured by the floods of
spring which tended to channelize temporarily and then be gone.
After a hundred years of urban and irrigation development, the
Platte River is now a haven, not only for people but for birds
and waterfowl. Every new project, such as the Two Forks
Reservoir, for which there is a water supply tends to increase
this bounty.
The Williams Fork Project
A different phase of the development of the Denver water
system relates to its Williams Fork project. During the
Depression of the 1930s, all governmental agencies were working
to find ways of putting the economy back in motion. Cities,
states, and principally the federal government, promoted public
projects. One of the ways of doing this was through the Public
Works Administration under which the United States would provide
a percentage of the cost of a local public project. The Denver
Charter requires that the entire cost of the operation of the
Denver water system be paid from rates charged to consumers. And
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it had always been so. But there is nothing in the Charter to
prevent accepting gifts.
Denver's Williams Fork project provided for a tunnel from
the Williams Fork River, which is a tributary of the Colorado
River, into Clear Creek, which is a tributary of the South Platte
River. During this period, Denver was beginning to have problems
with the treatment of its sewage effluent. One of the potential
methods of treatment was to provide high quality water to dilute
sewage as it entered the South Platte River. While the waters of
the Williams Fork had already been appropriated for all municipal
purposes, the work of building a collection canal system and a
tunnel under Jones Pass from the Williams Fork River to Clear
Creek was still in the survey and design stage.
The idea developed to use an abandoned canal called the
White Cap which ran from Clear Creek to a point on the Platte
River where its outfall would mingle with various raw sewage
outfalls in Denver before the polluted water would have to be
used by others.
Denver had the good fortune that its outstanding engineer,
George Bull, had been selected by the United States government to
approve various public works projects for a region including
Colorado. His offices were in El Paso, Texas. Denver Water
Board personnel presented to him a plan for immediate completion
of the design of the Williams Fork system and its construction to
meet the dilution water requirements of the State Health
Department. It took no long explanatory process to convince
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Mr. Bull because he was already familiar with the program, having
himself originally designed the outlines and assisted in the
preparation of the appropriation filings.
During the construction for the project, the standards for
sewage treatment were raised considerably so that mere dilution
was no longer adequate. So the question of whether dilution of
sewage as a beneficial use of water did not receive a judicial
determination. But the physical system had thus been put into
operation so as to bring water from western Colorado to the
Platte River basin for customary beneficial uses. Instead of
using the White Cap Canal, it was found economically feasible to
drive the Vasquez Tunnel from Clear Creek into the Moffat Tunnel
system, thus combining the waters of the Williams Fork River with
those of the Fraser River for use in the Denver water system.
Because these steps were purely mechanical and did not change the
ultimate purpose for which the water had been appropriated, no
court proceedings were required for their consumation.
The "Metro Sewage" Decision
To accommodate Denver's need to recycle its sanitary sewage
so as to make it meet acceptable standards, it became necessary
to move the place of return of Denver's sewage effluent from
above a major ditch to a point below that ditch. After the
change, the ditch would no longer receive the volume of the
return flow. The ditch company contested the right of Denver to
make this change, but the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Denver
22
Sewage Disposal District No. 1 v. Fanners Reservoir and
Irrigation Company. 179 Colo. 36, 499 P.2d 1190 (1972), held that
Denver, as the appropriator of the water which went through the
sanitary sewers was not obligated to continue its early practices
of returning such water to a natural watercourse at the same
place as it had historically.
Developed Water
There is a type of water outside the "natural stream" water
referred to in the constitution. That is water opened up by
man's activities, such as mining, which would not otherwise be
part of a natural stream or nontributary aquifer: developed
water.
I conceived this developed water concept in the case of
Pikes Peak Golf Club Inc. v. Kuiper. 169 Colo. 309 455 P.2d 882
(1969). In this case, one Roy Pring transformed an area
underlain by impervious shale from a place where practically all
of the water was consumed by plant life. Only occasionally did
any spill into Fountain Creek, a tributary of the Arkansas River,
so that 240 acre-feet of water annually was consumed on the
parcel itself, an amount which never reached Fountain Creek. By
draining the swampy area and husbanding the water very carefully,
a golf course was created and, for the first time, substantial
amounts of water spilled into Fountain Creek. The State Engineer
claimed this water for appropriators on Fountain Creek and
ordered the golf course to cease its operations and effectively
23
deliver the 240 acre-feet that had formerly been consumed by
plant life and evaporation, to water users on Fountain Creek.
The Supreme Court held that the 240 acre-feet of water was not
tributary water historically and therefore not subject to
administration by the State Engineer under the priority system.
Salvaged Water
A distinction must be made between developed water and
salvaged water. Developed water is water which was never part of
a natural water course or the tributary ground water which is
really part of a surface stream. Salvaged water is that which
has been part of a natural stream or might become a part of such
a stream but for changes brought about by the act of man.
The leading case regarding salvaged water is a decision
written by Justice Edward C. Day, noted for his practical horse-
sense approach to solving legal problems, in the Shelton Farms
Case. Southeastern Colorado Water
Conservancy District v. Shelton Farms. 187 Colo. 181, 529 P.2d
1321 (1974). It is well known that salt cedars in the bed of the
Arkansas River, much like cottonwood trees, evaporate large
amounts of water from the stream in which they are located. In
the Shelton Farms case, landowners who removed salt cedars from
their lands claimed a right to the saving to the stream brought
about by such removal. This was clearly not a new source of
water and any attempt to define it or administer it so as not to
injure senior appropriators of water would have been next to
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impossible. The Supreme Court rejected the salvage idea.
Recently, a retired Forest Service employee by the name of
Red Giffen, wrote a letter to the editor of a Denver newspaper
pointing out that in heavily forested areas very little of the
precipitation, whether it be snow or rain, ever reaches the
ground so as to get into the flowing streams. He pointed out
that careful cutting of timber could result in much more water
reaching flowing streams. Such cutting would leave stands of
timber adjacent to clear cut areas where small, newly growing
trees would not keep precipitation from reaching the ground.
Such a procedure over wide areas could produce substantially more
water in natural streams. The article did not note the cost of
this type of timber operation or of replanting. Those costs
would have to be weighed against the cost of cloud seeding in
areas tributary to natural streams but where heavy timber cover
would not prevent the precipitation from reaching the streams.
Such procedures seem to be far in the future when the population
of the United States increases to the point where water supplies
become a desperate necessity.
The "Vidler" Decision: The Question of Speculation
On the basis of distinguishing between "speculation" and
"appropriation," the Supreme Court has recently indicated that
unless an appropriator knew where he was going to put the water,
had a market for it, and could demonstrate that he had the water,
he could not make an appropriation. This is the decision in
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Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Water
Co.. 197 Colo. 413, 594 P.2d 566 (1979). Within 60 days of this
decision, the Colorado legislature passed definitive legislation
to provide guidelines reaffirming the conditional decree
statutes. (Colo. Rev. Sections 37-92-103(3)(a) and 305(9)(a) and
(b) (1973 and 1988 Supp.).
In an earlier case (Taussia v. Moffat Tunnel Water and
Development Co., 106 Colo. 384, 106 P.2d 363 (1940)), an
appropriator from the tributaries of the Fraser River had simply
said that he wanted to use the water in eastern Colorado, where
he knew there was need for a supply. A decree for this
appropriation was affirmed.
Under the earlier philosophy, the Highline Canal, 150 miles
in length, was built by English capital to serve land which had
not yet even been patented and in which the settlers had not yet
arrived to ultimately become water users. Appropriation was
confirmed after settlers arrived, patented the land and put the
water to use. Wheeler v. No. Colo. Irr. Co.. 10 Colo. 582, 17
P. 487 (1888).
As has been correctly stated by the Supreme Court on several
occasions, any water developer, whether public or private, could
not well afford to make great expenditures of money in the
development of a water resource in the present day without the
assurance of a decree to entitle the developer to the water
proposed to be put to beneficial use. It has always been
recognized that such a decree, for its final effectiveness, would
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be dependent on completing the appropriation with due diligence.
To assure that the proposed appropriator was not merely
speculating, but really intended to—and had the means
of—completing his project, it was required that a showing be
made every four years, in the case of a project taking many years
to develop, that the proposed appropriator was diligently
pursuing his appropriation. The four year requirement of a
showing of due diligence was expected to weed out the speculators
who might simply be attempting to tie up the water supply of a
stream in the hope of someday finding a way to make use of the
water. Vidler appeared to be a change of philosophy on the part
of the Supreme Court from its philosophy in Taussig. However
this may be, the definitive statute passed shortly after the
decision in Vidler furnished the criteria on which future
decisions of developers and courts must be based. This assumes,
of course, that the legislature has the law-making power under
our constitution and the Supreme Court is bound to follow the
laws as passed by the legislature regardless of any personal
views.
The Statutory Response to *Vidler*
Rather than further examination of Vidler. we therefore
should look at the new statute. Passed in 1986, the first thing
to be noted is that the statute ratifies the granting of
conditional decrees. In Colo. Rev. Stat. 37-92-103(3)(a) (1973
and 1988 Supp.), we find the words "but no appropriation of
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water, either absolute or conditional, shall be held to occur
when the proposed appropriation is based upon the speculative
sale or transfer of the appropriative rights to persons not
parties to the proposed appropriation, as evidenced by either of
the following: ***" Reference to "either absolute or conditional"
is a clear ratification of the long-standing practice that
decrees for uncompleted appropriations are to be given,
conditioned on ultimate appropriation of the water for beneficial
use. The language then goes on to give the courts criteria, not
for due diligence, but only for what is considered to be a
speculative appropriation.
The first criterion for what is to be considered speculative
is that the purported appropriator does not have either a legally
vested interest or a reasonable expectation of procuring such
interest in the lands or facilities to be served by such
appropriation, unless the appropriator is a governmental agency
or an agent-in-fact for the persons proposed to be benefitted by
the appropriation. First, we note that this language grants a
special preference to a governmental agency or one who is an
agent-in-fact for the persons proposed to be benefitted by the
appropriation. Section 6 of Article XVI of the Colorado
constitution militates against any special preference with the
words "the right to divert the unappropriated waters of any
natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied."
Next, it must be noted that the Highline Canal of the
Wheeler case could not have secured its date of appropriation,
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because the builders not only had no vested interest in the lands
to be served, but the settlers had not even arrived.
On the other hand, the second alternative may save the
situation. That alternative provides that the purported
appropriator of record must have a specific plan and intent to
divert, store or otherwise capture, possess, or control a
specific quantity of water for specific beneficial uses. This
language brings us back almost to Taussia. but not quite. In
Taussia. the appropriator really had a general plan of carrying
water from tributaries of the Fraser River and the Colorado River
watershed for beneficial use somewhere in the South Platte River
watershed where there was already a sufficient shortage of water
that there was a practical certainty that someone would make
beneficial use of the water once it arrived in that watershed. A
change in the statute requires a specific plan which would
necessarily require a fairly close definition, not only of the
source of water, but particularly as to the place and character
of use. The facts in the Wheeler case should meet this
criterion.
While it has always been well-established that the
Constitution authorizes appropriation for use and not for
speculation, as found in Supreme Court decisions, there had been
no legislative definition of speculation until 1979 with the
adoption of Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 37-92-103 (3)(a) (1973 and
1988 Supp.). The language of the statute is somewhat uncertain
in that it says that " * * * no appropriation of water * * *
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shall be held to occur when the proposed appropriation is based
upon the speculative sale or transfer of the appropriative rights
* * * * This language would not specifically eliminate
appropriation by an individual who did not propose to sell or
transfer the water, but was personally speculating as to how he
might apply the water to beneficial use. Such a concept may have
little practical relationship to present-day conditions because
appropriations today are made on a relatively large scale with a
view to application to beneficial use of the waters appropriated
by many individuals.
In 1979, the legislature added a new concept in a provision
found at Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 37-92-305(9)(b) (1973 and 1988
Supp.) with these words:
No claim for a conditional water right may be
recognized or a decree therefor granted except to the
extent that it is established that the waters can be
and will be diverted, stored, or otherwise captured,
possessed, and controlled and will be beneficially used
and that the project can and will be completed with
diligence and within a reasonable time.
This language requires an appropriator to have the gift of
prophesy. It is the word "established" which, if literally
applied, would make further appropriations impossible. When it
comes to the actual application of this word, the judiciary will
probably relate the word "established" to the concept of burden
of proof. This would mean that if the evidence made it reason
able to assume that there would probably be water available and
that the "specific plan" referred to at Section 37-92-103
(3)(a)(II) (1973 and 1988 Supp.) appears by competent evidence to
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be supported, a decree can be granted.
The McCarran Amendment
The National Reclamation Association (NRA) was a voluntary
group of representatives of all the reclamation states, that is,
those relying on the appropriation of water as the basis of their
social fabric. The Board of Water Commissioners of Denver, which
had all the powers of the city respecting the management and
operation of a waterworks system and plant, strongly supported
the NRA. Because of this, as an attorney for the Board, I held a
long tenure on its Resolutions Committee. One of the most active
programs of NRA was to integrate the United States claims for
water into the water rights systems of each of the reclamation
states.
Working under the auspices of the NRA, I prepared what was
known as the Barrett Bill, so named for the Wyoming represent
ative in Congress who introduced the bill. This bill simply
provided that the United States could only acquire water in any
state pursuant to the laws of that state. This comports with the
Reclamation Act, which says that, with respect to its reclamation
projects, the United States must acquire water under state law.
The concept gradually filtered through to the members of
Congress so that, in 1952, Senator McCarran of Nevada attached
the substance of the matter to another bill as an amendment.
When Senator McCarran brought the matter to where there was going
to be a real hearing and a recommendation to the Senate with
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respect to the concept, I received a telephone call from Judge
Sturrock from Texas, who was active in the National Reclamation
Association. He said that the time had come for me to get to
Washington and support the association's viewpoint. In these
hearings, my adversary was Bill Veeder, a Colorado lawyer who
practiced law in Colorado Springs but left there to work for the
U.S. Department of Justice. He is the one who started the Santa
Margarita cases in California (which nearly caused a revolution),
a very dedicated public servant for the United States and a true
believer that the United States should supersede the powers of
all individual states. He would never have voted even for a con
federacy. He believed in the dominant federal government and
made the case for the federal agencies before the Senate Commit
tee, saying that the United States had so many water rights that
it would take several years to prepare to present these cases for
adjudication. Thirty-five years later, the Department of Justice
is making the same plea in cases for adjudication of water rights
and asking for postponement because they have not had time to
find out what they needed or what they wanted.
Need for the McCarran Amendment
The necessity for integrating U.S. water claims into the
state administration system was emphasized by the Colorado
Supreme Court, whose Chief Justice Stone said in Denver v. North
ern Colorado Water Conservancy District. 130 Colo. 375, 414, 276
P.2d 992, 1011-12 (1955):
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Water rights cannot in fact be adjudicated as to part
of the claimants only. They are relative both as to
time and amount. None is certain unless all are
determined. If the contention of Government immunity
be true, then all the many water adjudication proceed
ings in Colorado and elsewhere in which the rights of
the United States have been submitted by its officers
and have been adjudicated by the court have resulted in
decrees void as to the United States and therefore
uncertain as to the rights of all other parties. If
this contention be true, the landowner who is so
fortunate as to have the use of other taxpayers' money
through the Reclamation Bureau in building his
reservoir or ditch is exempt from our statutory
proceedings for adjudication of his water rights, and
the arm of the state is paralyzed in this vital
function, at least until such time as the officers of
the Federal Government see fit in their superior wisdom
to bring action in the Federal Court.
The McCarran Amendment gave consent to join the United States as
a defendant in any suit for the adjudication of rights to the use
of water of a river system or other source or for the administr
ation of such rights. It provided that when the United States
was a party to any such suit, it should be deemed to have waived
any right to plead that the state laws are inapplicable or that
the United States is not amenable thereto by reason of its
sovereignty, and that the United States should be subject to the
judgments, orders and decrees of the court having jurisdiction.
Judicial Interpretation of the McCarran Amendment
The effectiveness of the McCarran Amendment was attacked by
the United States. Ken Balcomb, a Glenwood Springs attorney
representing Colorado River water users, took on the Department
of Justice so effectively that the United States Supreme Court
held that the McCarran Amendment meant just what it said: That
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an adjudication of water rights could be of any substantial
segment of a water system and did not have to cover an entire
water system, which was insisted on by the United States. It was
an obviously correct decision, and if it had gone pursuant to the
contentions of the United States Department of Justice, there
would have been no tribunal to hear adjudications of waters of
the Colorado River which run through seven states.
After passage of the McCarran Amendment, a quiet title suit
in federal court in Salt Lake City was turned back to the local
courts by the federal judge there. But Judge Knous of Montrose,
the judge in the United States District Court in Denver, retained
jurisdiction in the federal court of a quiet title suit by the
U.S. Department of Justice in an effort to evade the effect of
the McCarran Amendment. This would have been appealed by Denver
but for the fact that it finally worked out a settlement of the
relationship of Denver's Blue River diversions to the United
States Green Mountain Reservoir on the Blue River which resulted
in what is known as the Blue River Decree. I was living in an
oxygen tent at that time because of asthma, and the actual
negotiations were carried on by Harold Roberts assisted by John
Dickson. I appeared from time to time under heavy medication,
emerging from my oxygen tent for a few hours. The basic decree
was worked out when Lee Rankin represented the U.S. in October
1955. An impasse of conflicting views occurred in 1964 when
Denver started to fill Dillon Reservoir. When it appeared that a
negotiated settlement could not be reached, I contacted Ramsey
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Clark, a top legal person in the Department of Justice in
Washington, and we worked out the sticking point by phone so that
a negotiated decree was reached.
Federal Reserved Water Rights
In spite of the plain language of McCarran that in the
adjudication of water rights the United States, by the terms of
this law, could not plead that the state laws are inapplicable,
the Colorado Supreme Court, relying on U.S. Supreme Court -
decisions growing out of protection of Indian rights, discounted
this law, and other laws of congress, and held that the United
States has certain reserved rights. United States v. City and
County of Denver. 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982). This case has
sometimes been referred to as "Denver I." A similar case which
arose in a different water division covering the same issues
became known as "Denver II," this latter case being entitled City
and County of Denver v. United States. 656 P.2d 36 (Colo. 1982).
Denver I is a leading case resolving the relationships
between the United States government and the people of the State
of Colorado with respect to water. It reflects efforts commenced
more than 10 years earlier to define the position of the United
States, whose officers and employees had taken the general
position that the United States was above and beyond any author
ity of the individual sovereign states and did not have to comply
in any respect with state water law.
Jurisdiction over the United States has been obtained in
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every water division in the state. The question of the extent of
United States water rights was pushed in Water Divisions No. 1
and No. 5. The trial judge in Division No. 1 in the Denver II
case, Donald A. Carpenter, had been steeped in water law from the
time he had assisted his father, Delph Carpenter, in the making
of the Colorado River Compact and was thoroughly trained in the
law of water. Judge Carpenter entered a declaratory judgment, on
the basis of the pleadings, that the United States held no
reserved rights in Colorado, that Colorado laws are applicable to
the United States, as stated in the McCarran Amendment, that by
accepting Colorado into the union with a constitution providing
that all of the waters of the state belonged to the state itself
and that even before that, the United States, by the Desert Land
Act of 1877, the Act of July 9, 1870, and of July 26, 1866, the
United States had recognized that the water of the reclamation
states belonged to the people of those states. It was also noted
that the property of the United States can be disposed of only by
an act of the Congress and that, with respect to the statutes
just mentioned, there had been a disposal by Congress of the
waters of the reclamation states. The Colorado Supreme Court
refused to uphold Denver II.
In the decision in Denver I, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that: "The doctrine of federal reserved water rights is
judicially created." 656 P.2d 1, 17 (Colo. 1982). There has
never been an act of Congress creating reserved rights. The
Supreme Court in Denver I went on to say:
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Based upon a recognition of Congress' underlying power,
the United States Supreme Court has constructed a body
of law, derived by judicial implication from
congressional actions, holding that:
"Congress, in giving the President the power
to reserve portions of the federal domain for
specific federal purposes, impliedly
authorized him to reserve 'appurtenant water
then unappropriated to the extent needed to
accomplish the purposes of the reservation.'"
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at
699-700, 98 S. Ct. at 3013-3014 quoting,
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. at 138,
96 S. Ct. at 2 069 (emphasis in original).
Feeling obliged to follow decisions of the United States Supreme
Court respecting reserved rights, in spite of the peculiar
situation of Colorado with its constitutional provision, accepted
by Congress, that all the waters of Colorado belong to the people
of the State of Colorado, the Colorado Supreme Court in Denver I
determined that the United States does have reserved rights in
those unappropriated waters available at the time of a land
reservation without which the purpose of the land reservation
would be wholly defeated.
Since that time, in a matter concerning the oil shale claims
of the United States, in United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631
(Colo. 1986) the Court held that the United States can amend an
original application but the amendment takes the priority date of
the amendment and not the original application, thus upholding
Colorado's antedation law.
Regulation of Municipal Water Rates
Because of a wide law practice outside the Board of Water
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Commissioner's business, I have also been involved in the
application of the constitutional provision that no special
commission created by the legislature may take control of any
municipal assets. The Supreme Court of Colorado, itself a state
agency, has not favored this limitation on the powers of state
agencies, and it has found ways to limit it, particularly in the
electric field. Under the constitutional provision, a
municipally-owned water system may not have its rates or
practices governed by the Colorado Public Utilities Commission,
which is a special commission created by the legislature. The
provision was followed in a case involving the Denver Water
Department entitled City of Englewood v. City and County of
Denver, 123 Colo. 290, 229 P.2d 667 (1951).
Municipal Ownership of Water
In Colorado, most domestic water utilities, are
municipally-owned. As discussed, such municipal water utilities
are not subject to regulation by the Colorado Public Utilities
Commission. Another facet of municipal water ownership of water
is that, contrary to the law of contract carriage for
agricultural users who are the true owners of the water rights,
the customers of a domestic utility are not the true owners. In
a transfer case, the customers of a municipal utility are never
made parties. Nor do such customers have to be consulted with
respect to the acquisition or disposition of the water rights of
the utility.
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The universal custom in Colorado is that a purely domestic
water utility is the owner of the water rights and may deal with
them without consulting the ultimate users.
This is a necessary rule for practical reasons. Taking the
most extreme example, when the City and County of Denver is a
party to water litigation, the million people who receive that
water could not, in any practical sense, become parties to the
litigation. Nor could any one of those, or even a combination of
those who are users decide to take a portion of the water supply
and divert it through their own facilities as can be done by
agricultural users if they choose. The domestic water utility is
related to its users in the same way as an electric utility
without regard to the law governing the exercise of water rights.
Water Quality
Water law has developed to the point where now it is much
more than a question of putting water to use from natural streams
or underground aquifers, and has entered into the law of water
quality and the character of return flows. It is no longer
enough to have a water supply. When a developer plans to create
more housing, more manufacturing, or more office facilities,
water for these enterprises must be disposed of so as not to
impair the quality of the waters into which the return flows are
inserted. Consequently, the field of water law has now become a
field of environmental law in which the legal adviser must
contemplate not only securing a supply but the disposal of that
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supply in a safe and economical manner.
Colorado water law is a complete deviation from the old
English common law, which required natural streams to be allowed
to flow undiminished in quantity. Necessity in this arid region
created a new common law encouraging the removal of water from
streams to meet the needs of a civilized society. But the law
continues to follow that part of the old English common law,
which required natural streams to be left unimpaired in quality.
In what is known as the Chain 0'Mines case fWilmore v. Chain
0'Mines. 96 Colo. 319, 44 P.2d 1024 (1934)), tailings from mill
operations were emptying into Clear Creek Canyon above
agricultural lands irrigated by this water. These tailings were
filtering out when the water was applied to the land so that in a
field of corn which was a quarter mile in length along the
distribution system, the first corn would be a foot high while
the corn at the end of the row would be five or six feet tall.
In a suit to enjoin the miners, District Judge Charles
C. Sackmann in the Denver District Court held that a reasonable
amount of pollution had to be permitted because both the miners
and the agriculturalists had to be accommodated. The Supreme
Court reversed in the Chain O'Mines case, saying that the miners
had no right to pollute the stream so that its quality was below
that of the natural watercourse. This was particularly important
in this state because it affected the waters of Clear Creek,
properly named because in its natural state, it runs through rock
and gravel so as to be very clear and practically pure snow
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water. This early legal pronouncement is being emphasized more
and more today.
Decrees giving a right to divert for beneficial use referred
entirely to volumes of water and not at all to the quality of
that water. This matter came up in A-B Cattle Co. v. U.S., 196
Colo. 539, 589 P.2d 57 (1978) when the Pueblo Reservoir,
constructed in the streambed of the Arkansas River, changed the
quality of the river from heavily sedimented to essentially clear
water so that the Bessemer Ditch, which had always been sealed by
the natural sediment in the Arkansas River, became porous and
leaky.
The court was strongly divided as to the disposition of this
case. The original majority held that an appropriator has the
right to the natural quality of a stream without man-made
modifications of that quality. On rehearing, Justice Don Kelly
changed his position and accepted what had been originally the
minority view that only H2O is subject to appropriation, and
therefore the appropriator has no right to the quality of water
in the stream as it was in its state of nature.
What the final Groves majority had overlooked is the fact
that the Colorado Constitution does not merely say that pure
water is subject to appropriation, but says the "water of every
natural stream" is subject to appropriation. This certainly does
not refer to distilled water or pure H20. In the dissenting
opinion, which originally was the majority opinion by Justice
William Erickson, appears the sentence: "I sincerely hope that
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this Court will reconsider this issue in future years." It is my
view that this case must be reconsidered along with Colorado
Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961). They are
a part of developing law to which the legislature is going to
have to give consideration if it expects the Supreme Court to
avoid becoming a legislative body to fill a vacuum not filled by
the legislature.
The gist of A-B Cattle is that the change in stream content
was man-made, just as in Chain 0'Mines. No one today questions
that it is unlawful to dump man-made toxic material into a
natural stream. The final decision in A-B Cattle overlooks the
fact that the change in water quality complained of was man-made.
The recent New Mexico case of Ensenada v. Sleeper involved a
transfer of a decreed right which worked a man-made change in the
quality of stream flow. The court relied on A-B Cattle in
allowing the change, overlooking the fact that the change in
water quality was man-made.
Changing Beneficial Uses of Water
There is a change in the philosophy of what constitutes a
beneficial use which has occurred since 1860. As the United
States has developed, in addition to ranching and agriculture,
Colorado now has become a national asset, not only as an
educational and technical center, but also as a recreational
center. Some of the best values in Colorado are to be found in
its high mountains, its forests, its streams.
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The diversion of water is totally unnecessary for the
preservation of its forests except for the low value Blue Spruce,
which has to have its feet wet. Other evergreens obtain all
their water nourishment from their needles. However, these
forests can provide substantial storage where the trees are open
enough so that they act as a windbreak to drop blowing snow into
open spaces where it can reach the natural watercourses. Under a
law passed by the United States Congress, the national forests
are to be maintained for the purpose of providing a continuous
supply of water and timber. 16 U.S.C.A. Section 475 (1985).
These two objectives are consistent because with timber cutting
which provides open spaces for precipitation to fall and the
timbered areas to impede the flow of air so that the snow and
rain will get to the earth, both timber and water are supplied.
This is why there should be no wilderness areas where there are
forests because they are unproductive and inaccessible for
recreation to about 98% of the American public.
Cutting trees to create ski slopes creates open spaces where
snow can fall and also creates an economic benefit to the state.
Ski areas require a domestic supply of water, which means that a
substantial amount of high-altitude water needs to be retained to
sustain the ski industry.
Another area of recreation is river rafting and kayaking. A
very early statute permitted the floating of logs on our
streams. With modern transportation, this statute can be
repealed as unnecessary. On the other hand, river rafting and
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kayaking have become a major sport and a major economic benefit
to Colorado. The diversion of water out of the streams so as to
diminish their flow impairs this kind of use. Such a use, at the
beginning of Colorado, would have been unthought of. It would
not have been considered beneficial. Beneficial use must
necessarily mean utility for the needs of mankind. Mankind today
does want river rafting, and consequently the maintenance of
streams for this sort of use has become a beneficial use which
was not in existence at the time Colorado water law was first
envisioned. Colorado law does not yet adequately meet this
problem, particularly in that it attempts to give the state of
Colorado the sole right to appropriate water for this beneficial
use, although the constitution clearly says that the right to
appropriate water for beneficial use shall never be denied to
anyone.
Interstate Water Allocations
Because Colorado is at the high point in the Northern
Hemisphere of the range of mountains that runs from the south to
the north throughout the Western Hemisphere, waters from its
natural water courses flow out of the state and into other
states. Broadly speaking, legal rights with respect to the
waters of these interstate streams are treated the same as waters
moving from one fully sovereign state to another. In Europe,
water moves in international streams from one nation to another.
Each of these nations is sovereign. The same thing is true of
44
the states of the United States except to the extent that they
have given up a portion of their sovereignty to the Union. The
basic law of interstate streams in the United States as it
affects relations between various states is the same as the law
of international streams between fully sovereign nations.
There are many refinements but, basically, each sovereign
has the right to an equitable apportionment of the waters of an
interstate stream. The equity is based on preservation of the
existing civilization. This requires a consideration of such
matters as maintenance of commerce and of water quality. The
international law protecting commerce is strongly influenced by
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, as
recently illustrated in the case of Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458
U.S. 941 (1982) in a matter which is not directly within the
experience of the writer.
Allocations of the Colorado River
Well within the immediate experience of the writer, however,
is the Colorado River Compact and the Upper Colorado River
Compact. The operation of the terms of the Colorado River
Compact should be of great concern to the states of the Upper
Basin.
The Lower Basin states of the Colorado River Drainage Basin
are endeavoring to create a perception that, aside from the
Mexican commitment, the states of the Upper Basin must supply
them with 7-1/2 million acre-feet of water from the Colorado
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River at Lee Ferry each year, regardless of any deficiency in
runoff, so that if there is less than 15 million acre-feet of
water available at Lee Ferry in any year, the entire shortage
must be borne by the Upper Basin. The time may now be
approaching when this concept should be rectified.
Article III(a) of the Compact makes an apportionment of
water of 1-1/2 million acre-feet to the Upper Basin and 7-1/2
million acre-feet to the Lower Basin. It was thought that there
was substantially more than 15 million acre-feet available for
division and, therefore, Article III(b) provided for the Lower
Basin to increase its beneficial consumptive use by 1 million
acre-feet per year. In addition, paragraph (c) provided for
water for the Republic of Mexico out of surplus waters above the
16 million acre-feet provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b) .
Subparagraph (c) also provided that if there was not a sufficient
surplus to meet the Mexican obligation, the burden of any such
deficiency would be borne equally by the Upper and Lower Basins,
again emphasizing an equal division of responsibility.
Subparagraph (f) provided for a further equitable apportionment
any time after October 1, 1963, after the 16 million acre-feet
had been totally consumed. Since 1963, the river has never
reached 15 million acre-feet. Consequently, all thought of a
further apportionment has been abandoned.
In order to avoid the injury which might occur as the result
of a particularly dry year or dry period, Article III(d)
attempted to make the equal division of water between the Upper
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and Lower Basins workable by providing a ten-year running average
of 75 million acre-feet, rather than requiring 7-1/2 million
acre-feet each and every year.
When Article III(c) provided for Mexico's claims, it
clearly made the additional apportionment of Article III(b) water
a burden to be borne equally by the Upper and Lower Basins
without providing a guarantee of flow by the Upper Basin.
Careful consideration should be given to the proposition of
whether or not the III(b) apportionment was intended not to
interfere with the basic apportionment of 15 million acre-feet,
but effective only if there were a surplus over that amount,
regardless of the further apportionment provided for in III(f).
There is provided in III(f) for further apportionment of flows
beyond the 15 million acre-feet anticipated in III(a), the one
million acre-feet in III(b), and the Mexican water of III(c).
III(f) leaves the apportionment wide open—all to Lower Basin,
all to Upper Basin, or whatever. Of course, the additional
apportionment under III(f) available after 1963 will not occur,
as we discuss below.
Those in the Upper Basin who have responsibility for
implementation of the Colorado River Compact and the Upper
Colorado River Compact need to keep in mind that Article III(a)
and (b) are apportionments of water, but that Article III(d) is
not an apportionment but simply a device to implement the
apportionment. When the Lower Basin seeks to use III(d) as an
guarantee of 7-1/2 million acre-feet of water annually, on an
47
average, it must be borne in mind that there is an evident intent
in the Compact to divide the water equally between the Upper and
Lower Basins, and that III(d) is simply an ill-conceived manner
of dividing the water equally based on a mutual mistake of fact.
Flows Available in the Colorado River
The State Engineer is exceedingly well aware of the fact
that of the 26 years of recorded flow at Lee Ferry prior to the
negotiation of the Compact, the last 24 years far exceeded 150
million acre-feet per decade of water available for division.
The fact is that the division was made on recorded flows which
are the highest in the entire history of the Colorado River and
have never been met since the making of the Compact. The facts
were sufficiently obscure at the time of the Compact negotiations
that the states believed there would be a substantial amount of
water available for further division among them in the future and
provided a date for that further division. The date has long
since passed, and everyone who knows anything about the matter is
aware that there is no surplus, and, as a matter of fact, there
is a deficiency of water when full utilization is made by each
state of its allotment.
In addition to physically recorded flows, we now have access
to tree ring records which confirm the fact that the Compact was
made on a mistaken set of facts, to wit: The flows used as the
basis for division of water among the states of the Colorado
River Basin were the highest since the year 1500. In addition,
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we are aware now of five drought periods which have occurred in
the course of history of more than a third century each, when it
is certain that the flows at Lee Ferry will be such that there is
much less than 15 million acre-feet of water to divide between
the Upper and Lower Basins. In fact, the river may become so
deficient that unless there is equal division between the Upper
and Lower Basins, and the Upper Basin is held to a 75 million
acre-foot delivery at Lee Ferry for each successive ten-year
period, there would be a substantial reduction in water for the
Upper Basin states.
Reformation of the Compact
As a matter of equity and justice, the Lower Basin is
entitled to know now, before it spends more money on further
water development out of the Colorado River Basin, that it does
not have an assured supply of 75 million acre-feet every ten
successive years. In order that equities may not run against the
Upper Basin, the time has come for the Upper Basin states to join
together in litigation seeking the reformation of the Compact,
which is a contract as well as a treaty among the states.
Reformation of a contract can be made to conform to the true
facts when the contract was made upon the basis of a mutual
mistake of fact. The reformation would be on the basis of
securing an equal division between the Upper and the Lower Basins
which would simply require a change of the number to meet the now
proven situation.
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There is no reason to try to renegotiate the entire Colorado
River Compact. It has now been in operation for more than 60
years and is the basis for judicial decisions and the Upper Basin
Compact, as well as federal legislation, all of which rely on the
equal division of waters between the Upper and Lower Basins of
the Colorado River. The principles of the Compact are sound: an
equal division of the waters between the Upper and Lower Basins.
The compact should simply be reformed to reflect its intent in
the light of now known availability of water.
From a tactical standpoint, Colorado should not undertake
the reformation effort alone. This should be a unanimous effort
by all of the Upper Basin states. Colorado has historically been
the leader, not only in creating water law, but in creating
relations with other states, not only because of the capability
of its people, but because of the necessity arising out of the
fact that waters flow out of Colorado into other states with
practically none flowing into Colorado, creating a need for
Colorado to protect its interests either by judicial decision or
compact involving downstream states. Although the principles
above stated were delineated by a group of Coloradoans an number
of years ago, it turned out that the political climate was
adverse for Colorado to exercise leadership at that point. That
time may be soon approaching.
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